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“REGISTRATION . . . MEANS A REGISTRATION”:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION OF
THE “APPLICATION APPROACH” TO COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATION IN COSMETIC IDEAS, INC. V.
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
Greg Darley-Emerson*

I. INTRODUCTION
A jewelry manufacturing company created and began selling a
particular costume jewelry necklace. 1 Over half a decade later, another
company allegedly manufactured and sold copies of a virtually identical
necklace. The first company filed for a copyright registration in an
effort to protect its intellectual property, aware that such a registration is
required to sue for copyright infringement.
But when is a copyright “registered?” This seemingly simple
question has a surprisingly ambiguous answer. Registration of a
copyright is required in order to bring an infringement action, 2 and a
court’s determination of when registration takes effect can have
significant repercussions for copyright holders seeking to enforce their
rights. Federal circuit courts, however, are split regarding exactly when
“registration . . . has been made.” 3 Several circuit courts have found that
registration occurs when the Copyright Office receives all of the
applicable materials from the copyright holder. 4 Other circuit courts
have found that registration does not occur until the Register of
Copyrights affirmatively approves the application and issues a certificate
of registration. 5
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank his editors for their feedback and suggestions, his professors for their wisdom and guidance,
and his family, especially his wife, for their love and support.
1. These alleged facts are adapted from the case primarily discussed in this Note. See Cosmetic
Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title.”).
3. Id.
4. See Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Apple Barrel
Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
5. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005),
abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v.
Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
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These divergent approaches may have a significant effect on the
course of an infringement suit, especially in federal circuits that have not
expressly considered the issue. This ambiguity may result in unfairness
to litigants; a court in one circuit may allow a copyright holder’s suit to
proceed while a court in a different circuit may dismiss an infringement
case on the exact same facts.
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/Interactivecorp widened the circuit split. 6 The Cosmetic Ideas
court found that a copyright registration is effective—thereby enabling
the copyright holder to institute an infringement suit—when the
Copyright Office receives the appropriate materials, not when the
Register acts upon them. 7
This Note argues that the Cosmetic Ideas court’s decision was in
error. Part II briefly discusses the history and substance of the
Copyright Act of 1976; it also examines copyright registration decisions
from federal circuit courts prior to Cosmetic Ideas. Part III reviews the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas. Part IV examines the
decision in light of the plain language of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) and related
sections, the statute’s legislative history, various sources of persuasive
authority, and policy goals behind the Copyright Act. Part V concludes
that the Ninth Circuit adopted the wrong approach to copyright
registration. The section also urges the Supreme Court or Congress to
clarify the meaning of “registration” under § 411(a) in order to unify
United States copyright law and to resolve when a copyright holder may
bring an infringement action.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the basis for copyright law in the
United States, 8 and § 411(a) requires that registration be made in order
for an infringement action to be instituted. 9 District and circuit courts
have varied in their interpretations of this statute. Subpart A discusses
the Copyright Act of 1976; subpart B discusses the circuit courts that
found, prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas, 10 that
copyright registration is complete upon the Copyright Office’s receipt of
the applicable materials (the “Application Approach”); and subpart C
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
6. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
7. Id. at 619.
8. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010).
9. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
10. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
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discusses the circuit courts that have found that registration is complete
only upon affirmative action by the Register of Copyrights (the
“Registration Approach”). 11
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
The U.S. Constitution provides the foundation for copyright law in
America. Article I, § 8 grants Congress the enumerated power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” 12 The Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act or the
1976 Act) 13 unified the confusing mix of federal and state laws
regarding published and unpublished works. 14 In passing the Act,
Congress broadened copyright protections and eliminated some statutory
formalities by recognizing that a copyright exists the moment an idea
finds original expression in some tangible medium. 15
Registration of a copyright is now voluntary and does not impact the
protections that copyrights offer. 16 In order to register a copyright, a
copyright holder must submit three items to the Copyright Office: (1) an
application; 17 (2) a deposit (such as a photocopy) of the work; 18 and (3)
the appropriate fee. 19
So that a robust federal register could be established, Congress
created several incentives to encourage voluntary registration. 20 For
11. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir.
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). The Tenth Circuit
seems to have coined the phrases “Registration Approach” and “Application Approach” in the La
Resolana Architects opinion; this Note will use these terms to refer to these approaches throughout.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is also the bedrock for America’s patent laws.
13. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010).
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; see also Cosmetic
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618–19 (discussion of copyrights before and after the 1976 Act).
15. See La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1199; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression . . . .”).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (“Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (“[R]egistration of a claim to copyright in any work, whether published or
unpublished, can be made voluntarily . . . .”).
17. 17 U.S.C.A. § 409 (West 2010).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2006).
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 708 (West 2010).
20. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010) (Congress
“chose to encourage copyright holders to register . . . through various statutory incentives.”), cert.
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010); La Resolana Architects,
416 F.3d at 1204–05 (“[T]hese rights and remedies are the ‘carrot’ to induce registration and the ‘stick’
is the lack of federal court jurisdiction until registration is accomplished.”), abrogated in part by Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (noting that registration is a precondition to suit but
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example, copyright registration enables a copyright owner to recover
statutory damages and attorney’s fees from an infringing party. 21 A
certificate of registration can act as prima facie evidence of the
copyright’s validity. 22 Finally, and perhaps most importantly (and
certainly most importantly as far as this Note is concerned), a work must
be registered before a copyright owner can file an infringement action. 23
Section 411 of the 1976 Act embodies this last incentive and reads in
part:
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author
under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no
civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright
claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however,
where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been
delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement
if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register
of Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to
the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim
by entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the
Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to determine that issue. 24

In the years subsequent to the passing of the 1976 Act, Congress
amended it to ensure the United States’ compliance with the Berne
Convention, an international copyright treaty that in part forbids the
application of formalities to foreign copyright holders. 25 In order to join
the Berne Convention, Congress established a two-tier system in which
owners of U.S. copyrighted works are required to register as a
precondition to an infringement suit, but owners of foreign copyrighted
works are not. 26
Section 101 of the Act vaguely says that “‘[r]egistration’ . . . means a
registration of the claim in the original or the renewed and extended
term of copyright.” 27 This definition is unclear regarding when
registration is complete so that a civil action may commence. Some
does not affect subject matter jurisdiction).
21. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 2010).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006).
23. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Berne Convention art. 5(1, 2), Oct. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2853, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27.
26. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until . . . registration . . . has been made[.]” (emphasis added)).
27. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010).
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courts have found registration to be complete when a copyright owner’s
application, deposit, and fee are received by the Copyright Office; 28 this
has been called the Application Approach. Other courts have found that
registration requires an affirmative act, such as the Register’s approval,
the issuance of a certificate, or the receipt of a certificate; 29 this has been
called the Registration Approach. These approaches are discussed more
fully in the following subparts.
B. The Application Approach
Prior to the Cosmetic Ideas decision, two circuit courts and several
district courts subscribed to the Application Approach 30 —the idea that
copyright “registration” is complete when the Copyright Office receives
the copyright owner’s application, fees, and deposit. 31
The Fifth Circuit employed the Application Approach in Apple Barrel
Productions, Inc. v. Beard, in which the parents of children who
performed in a country music program split from the program’s creator
to form their own similar show. 32 The creator sued for copyright
infringement, and the District Court for the Northern District of Texas
denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 33 In finding
that the plaintiff had standing for a copyright infringement action despite
having not received certificate of copyright registration at the time of the
injunction hearing, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “One need only prove
payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt
by the Copyright Office of a registration application.” 34 The court gave
no underlying reasons for its conclusory statement.
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted the Application Approach. 35 In
28. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984).
29. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir.
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Beard, 730
F.2d at 386–87; Prunté v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2007); Iconbazaar,
L.L.C. v. America Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Havens v. Time Warner, Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
31. See also Mose Bracey, Searching for Substance in the Midst of Formality: Copyright
Registration as a Condition Precedent to the Exercise of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction by Federal Courts
Over Copyright Infringement Claims, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111 (2006) (reviewing the circuit split and
recommending the Application Approach); Sara Goldfarb, Comment, Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
– Needlessly Endorsing Overly Strict U.S. Registration Requirements in Copyright Infringement
Litigation, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 419 (2006) (supporting the Application Approach).
32. Beard, 730 F.2d 384.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Id. at 386–87 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 7.16[B][1] (1978)).
35. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d 624.
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Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc., a public school teacher,
who also edited a local Chicago newspaper aimed at teachers, published
the entire contents of several standardized tests in order to show that the
school district was administering bad tests. 36 The school district sued
the teacher and the publication for infringement, and the magistrate
judge issued an injunction that prohibited the publication of any more
tests. 37 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, found that the
publication was not “fair use” but also that the injunction was
overbroad. 38 In doing so, he dismissed as “frivolous” the defendant–
infringer’s argument that the school district did not have a valid
copyright registration. 39 In finding the registration valid, he noted that
“an application for registration must be filed [with the Copyright Office]
before the copyright can be sued upon.” 40 Two sentences later,
however, Judge Posner hedged and said that “[h]ad the [copyright] claim
been false, the registration should not have issued and maybe therefore
the copyright could not have been sued upon,” 41 indicating that
registration may require an affirmative act by the Copyright Office, such
as the issuance of a certificate.
C. The Registration Approach
At least two circuit courts and several district courts subscribe to the
Registration Approach 42 —the idea that copyright “registration” is
complete only when the Copyright Office has affirmatively approved the
applicant’s copyright.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Registration Approach in La Resolana
Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 43 a case in which an
architecture firm discovered that a realty company was selling
36. Id.
37. Id. at 625–26.
38. Id. at 631–32.
39. Id. at 631.
40. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. 411(a) (West 2010); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34,
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir.
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes,
Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Mays & Assocs., Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Md. 2005);
Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp.
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
43. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195. By extensively discussing both the Registration and
Application Approaches before adopting the Registration Approach, the opinion provides a nice yin to
Cosmetic Ideas’s yang, which adopts the Application Approach after an equally extensive discussion.
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townhouses that “looked strikingly similar” to those in architectural
drawings previously produced by the firm. 44 The firm applied for
copyright registration and sued for copyright infringement. 45 The
District Court of the District of New Mexico dismissed the action,
however, because the firm had not yet received its registration
certificate. 46 After reviewing general copyright law, the plain language
of the relevant statutes, the various interpretations of the statutes, and
subsequent acts of Congress, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Registration
Approach and affirmed the dismissal. 47 The court held that registration
of a copyright under § 411(a) occurs only when the Copyright Office
approves the application. 48
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v.
Ameron Homes, Inc. when the plaintiff, a home builder, alleged that the
defendant, a competitor, copied a home’s floor plan from one of the
plaintiff’s advertising brochures. 49 Although the plaintiff had filed an
application for copyright registration, the district court dismissed the
initial case due to the plaintiff’s “failure to satisfy the condition
precedent of having registered its copyright before initiating the
infringement action.” 50 Once the Copyright Office issued the certificate,
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida allowed the
plaintiff to amend its complaint and proceed. 51 The Eleventh Circuit
approved the district court’s actions, noting that the registration
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an infringement suit, 52 and
44. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1197.
45. Id. at 1197.
46. Id. at 1197–98.
47. Id. at 1198–207; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408–412 (West 2010).
48. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203. Furthermore, the court found that “registration”
required only the Register’s approval and not necessarily the issuance or possession of a certificate,
although a certificate had evidentiary value in an infringement case. Id. at 1207–08. In La Resolana,
the Copyright Office had actually approved the registration but had not yet issued a certificate when the
suit was filed. The district court deemed a letter from the Copyright Office saying the same
inadmissible as hearsay, and because the plaintiff did not appeal the ruling, the circuit court was forced
to affirm the dismissal because it had no evidence before it that showed that the work was registered. Id.
at 1208.
49. M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in
part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
50. Id. at 1488–89.
51. Id. at 1489. The circuit court noted the unusual procedural posture of this case: after the
district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it was technically without
jurisdiction to entertain the motion to amend, and the plaintiff should have filed a new lawsuit. The
circuit court, however, noted that “‘[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere
technicalities.’” Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)).
52. Id. at 1488. The Muchnick court recently held that the registration requirement is
nonjurisdictional and is instead merely a precondition to an infringement suit. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
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generally equating “registration” with the issuance of a certificate. 53
III. THE CASE: COSMETIC IDEAS, INC. V. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
On May 25, 2010, the Ninth Circuit decided Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/Interactivecorp and joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in
adopting the Application Approach to copyright registration, creating a
3–2 split among federal circuits. 54 Below, subpart A presents the facts
of the case, subpart B reviews the court’s examination of the statute’s
language and context, and subpart C summarizes the court’s decision
and reasoning.
A. Brief Facts of Cosmetic Ideas
In Cosmetic Ideas, plaintiff Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. (Cosmetic) accused
the defendants IAC/Interactivecorp, Home Shopping Network, Inc.,
HSN LP, and HSN General Partner LLC (collectively HSN) of
copyright infringement. 55 Cosmetic created a costume jewelry necklace
in 1997 and began selling copies in 1999. 56 Cosmetic alleged that HSN
began manufacturing and selling “virtually identical” necklaces
sometime between 2005 and 2008. 57 Cosmetic submitted a copyright
application to the Copyright Office on March 6, 2008, and shortly
thereafter received confirmation that the application had been
received. 58 Cosmetic then filed a complaint against HSN on March 27,
2008, alleging copyright infringement of the necklace. 59
At the time of Cosmetic’s filing, the Copyright Office had not yet

Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1247 (2010). Thus, when the M.G.B. Homes court called the requirement a
“condition precedent,” 903 F.2d at 1489, they were spot-on; when they called it a “jurisdictional
prerequisite,” id. at 1488, they were not. The Muchnick court would likely consider the M.G.B. Homes
court’s analysis a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].” Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1244 (citations omitted).
53. M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488–89 (citing Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658,
661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Receipt of an actual certificate of registration or denial of same is a jurisdictional
requirement . . . .”); Int’l Trade Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“A
suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of
registration.”)) (citations omitted).
54. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). As mentioned above, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits endorse the Application Approach, while the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
endorse the Registration Approach.
55. Id. at 613–14.
56. Id. at 614.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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issued a certificate of copyright. 60 HSN argued that Cosmetic did not
have a valid copyright registration, and the district court granted HSN’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 61 The Ninth
Circuit reversed after conducting a de novo review of the district court’s
statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act and finding that mere
application to the Copyright Office for registration met § 411(a)’s
precondition for an infringement suit. 62
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional, Textual, and Contextual
Examination
In determining that the Application Approach was the correct
interpretation of § 411(a), the Ninth Circuit first dispensed with any
jurisdictional questions. It then looked to the plain language of the
statute and, finding the language ambiguous, finally turned to the
overarching policy goals of the Copyright Act of 1976 and its
subsequent revisions. The court’s analysis of (1) its jurisdiction, (2) the
statute’s language, and (3) the statute’s context are discussed below.
1. Jurisdictional Analysis
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed a jurisdictional
concern. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, but between when the case was argued on appeal and
when it was decided, the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 411(a)’s registration requirement was merely a precondition to filing a
claim and not a restriction on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.63
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction over the
case. 64

60. Id. The Copyright Office did subsequently issue a certificate of copyright, and Cosmetic
filed a new infringement action against HSN, which the district court stayed pending the outcome of the
appeal of this case.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 614–15 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)). Muchnick
abrogated in part a number of the precedential cases cited by the Ninth Circuit to the extent that those
cases found that § 411(a) restricted a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; however, Muchnick did not
affect determinations of when “registration” occurred (i.e., whether the courts followed an Application
Approach or a Registration Approach). Id. at 614–615. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
the issue before the court was potentially moot as Cosmetic Ideas held a registration certificate at the
time of appeal. Id. at 616. However, because it was an unsettled point of law that was “‘capable of
repetition yet evading review,’” the court addressed the issue of when copyright registration was
complete. Id. at 616 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (citation omitted)).
64. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 615.
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2. Plain Language of the Statute
When interpreting a statutory provision, a court begins with the
statute’s plain language. 65 The Cosmetic Ideas court began by analyzing
the language of the relevant sentence of § 411(a): “‘[N]o civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until pre-registration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.’” 66 The court found that
“registration” was “unhelpfully defined” in § 101 of the Copyright Act
as “a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended
term of copyright.” 67
Finding “no guidance” in the statutory definition, 68 the court turned to
the language of the statute as a whole to determine its intended meaning
and found further ambiguity. 69 In effect, it found two parts that
supported the Registration Approach, one part that supported the
Application Approach, and one part that could support either. 70
In support of the Registration Approach, the court found language
that seemed to require affirmative action by the Register of Copyright,
indicating that application alone was not enough to effect “registration.”
For example, § 410(a) directs the Register, upon examination and
approval, to “register the claim and issue the applicant a certificate,” 71
showing that Congress meant registration to be incomplete until the
Register granted approval. 72 Section 411(a) gives an applicant the right
to institute a civil infringement action when “the deposit, application,
and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been refused,” 73 indicating
that the registration process is separate from the application process. 74
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that other sections of the Act

65. Id. (citing K & N Eng’g, Inc., v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)).
66. Id. at 616 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010)).
The court noted that
“preregistration” was only applicable to certain commercial works that have a history of infringement
prior to commercial release; the necklace at issue in this case was not one of those works. Id. at 616 n.6.
67. Id. at 616 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010)).
68. Id. at 616–17.
69. Id. (citing United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009)).
70. Id. at 617–18 (finding that § 410(a) and portions of § 411(a) support the Registration
Approach, that § 408(a) may support the Application Approach, and that § 410(d) could be read to
support either one).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
72. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“This provision places an active burden of examination and
registration upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not accomplished by application alone.”).
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
74. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“[T]his subsection could be read to mean that Congress
intended registration to require acceptance or refusal by the Register, not mere delivery.”).
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supported the Application Approach. For example, § 408(a) states that a
copyright owner “may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the
Copyright Office” the required deposit, application, and fee, 75 indicating
that mere delivery of the appropriate materials secures registration.76
Finally, the court found that one section of that statute could support
either approach. Section 410(d) provides that “[t]he effective date of a
copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and
fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights . . . to be
acceptable for registration, have all been received in the Copyright
Office.” 77 This passage supports the Registration Approach in that the
Register of Copyrights must examine the materials and deem them
acceptable before the copyright’s registration date takes effect. 78 On the
other hand, it may also support the Application Approach because a
valid copyright’s registration takes effect on the date the materials are
received by the Copyright Office, assuming that approval is granted
later. 79
3. Context of the Statute
Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plain
language of § 411(a) and the surrounding sections did little to resolve
whether “registration” of a copyright was complete upon application of
materials or approval of such application, the court then looked to the
context, history, and purpose of the statute. 80
It first noted that the 1976 Act differed from the 1909 Act in that it
broadened its protections, increased incentives to create expressive
works, and relaxed the 1909 Act’s formalities. 81 The court also noted
that Congress amended the 1976 Act to comply with the Berne
Convention, relaxing the formalities even further. 82 Finally, the court
75. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
76. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“This section implies that the sole requirement for
obtaining registration is delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (emphasis added).
78. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618 (“[T]he statute could be read to require action by the
Register to effect registration.”).
79. Id. (noting that this section “supports the interpretation that application is the critical event”).
80. Id. (“We are not persuaded that the plain language of the Act unequivocally supports either
the registration or application approach.”).
81. Id. at 618–19 (internal citations omitted). For example, the 1976 Act established copyright
upon creation of the work rather than the 1909 Act’s requirement of publication, notice, registration, and
deposit of the work. The 1976 Act created a unitary federal system for works both published and
unpublished where the 1909 Act left the protection of unpublished works to the states. Furthermore, the
1976 Act relaxed notice requirements and eliminated mandatory registration.
82. Id. at 619, nn.9 & 12. The U.S. adopted amended copyright laws in 1988 in order to become
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discussed Congress’s interest in maintaining a robust federal register and
incentivizing registration, 83 and it noted that “copyright holders
frequently register specifically for the purpose of being able to bring
suit.” 84
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision and Reasoning
After reviewing the statute’s plain language and context, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that a copyright owner could bring an infringement
action upon mere application for copyright registration. The court was
persuaded that the Application Approach “better fulfill[ed] Congress’s
purpose of providing broad copyright protection while maintaining a
robust federal register” for the following reasons. 85
First, the court found that the Application Approach avoided
unnecessary delays in litigation. Because § 411(a) allows a copyright
owner to bring suit whether the Copyright Office accepts or rejects the
registration, 86 the court found no reason to force a litigant to wait for a
decision that ultimately had little effect. 87 It found support in Nimmer
on Copyright, a leading copyright treatise: “‘[G]iven that the
claimant . . . will ultimately be allowed to proceed regardless of how the
Copyright Office treats the application, it makes little sense to create a
period of “legal limbo” in which suit is barred.’” 88
The Ninth Circuit also found that the Application Approach kept
intact the various goals of the 1976 Act. For one, it maintained the
incentive to register one’s creative work, leading to a more robust
federal register. 89 Abolishing the need to wait for the issuance of a
certificate also eliminated “the type of needless formality Congress
party to the agreement. See Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853. For example, § 410(a) makes
notice entirely permissive, and foreign works are not subject to § 411(a)’s pre-suit registration
requirement. See also Berne Convention, art. 5(2), Oct. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2853, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9927.
83. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659). Registration is optional, but incentives associated with registration include
allowing a registration certificate to be prima facie evidence of a valid copyright (§ 410(c)), making
certain remedies such as statutory damages and attorney’s fees available only after registration (§ 412),
and requiring registration of U.S. works as a prerequisite to bringing any infringement action (§ 411(a)).
84. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619.
85. Id.
86. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (noting that if a copyright registration is rejected, an
infringement action may still proceed as long as the Register is provided with notice of the suit).
87. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–20.
88. Id. at 620 (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a][i]).
89. Id. The court, however, also noted that the Registration Approach preserved this goal
equally well. Id. at 620. This Note argues below that the Registration Approach incentivizes
registration even more effectively than the Application Approach.
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generally worked to eliminate in the 1976 Act.” 90
According to the court, the Application Approach helps to make the
judicial system more efficient. 91 The possession of a certificate has no
substantive impact on a copyright holder’s overall right to bring a suit, 92
and forcing litigants to wait for a registration certificate under the
Registration Approach could result in the dismissal of suits that would
likely be refiled in a matter of weeks or months. 93
Furthermore, the Application Approach protects a copyright owner
from being disadvantaged by any delay inherent in the Copyright
Office’s processing of the application. 94 The statute of limitations for a
copyright infringement suit is three years. 95 If registration did not occur
until the Register issued a certificate, then copyright owners who filed
for registration late in the three-year period would be penalized for any
delay by the Copyright Office, potentially losing their entire right to
sue. 96 If, on the other hand, registration is complete upon the Register’s
mere receipt of the appropriate materials, copyright holders run little risk
of the statute of limitations expiring other than due to their own delay.97
Finally, the court noted that the Register’s decision did not require
deference. If the Register rejects the registration of a copyright already
in litigation, the Register still has an opportunity to appear regarding
registrability, especially given the (slow) pace of litigation. 98 The court
found the Register’s decision of whether to grant a registration
certificate “largely perfunctory, and . . . ultimately reviewable by the
courts,” lending no compelling reason for the delay of infringement
litigation. 99
The Ninth Circuit ultimately adopted the Application Approach over
the Registration Approach and held that the registration requirement of

90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491, 2002 WL 1906620, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) (noting that the Registration Approach “leads to an inefficient and peculiar
result”).
92. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 620–21. Section 410(d) gives another protection for a timelag by making the effective
date of a registration the day on which the materials are received by the Copyright Office, the date from
which statutory damages may be recovered. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 410, 504 (West 2010).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
96. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620.
97. Id. This is especially the case given that an application for copyright registration can be
made virtually instantly via the Copyright Office’s online application option. See Electronic Copyright
Office, www.copyright.gov/eco (last visited June 13, 2011).
98. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34,
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]).
99. Id. at 621.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 7
K-EMERSON

1560

9/24/2011 4:27:27 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

§ 411(a) is fulfilled when the Copyright Office receives a completed
registration application. 100 It found the text of the statute ambiguous
and held that the Application Approach better afforded the broad
protection intended by the 1976 Act, better promoted judicial economy,
and better accomplished Congress’s goal of compiling a robust federal
register of existing copyrights. 101 In so holding, it vacated and reversed
the district court’s dismissal, allowing Cosmetic Ideas’s infringement
claim to proceed on the merits. 102
IV. DISCUSSION
The following subparts detail how the Ninth Circuit erred in adopting
the Application Approach. Subparts A and B discuss the plain language
of the statute and its legislative history, respectively, and find that both
support the Registration Approach. Subpart C finds that the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly relied upon or ignored various sources of persuasive
authority, including other federal circuit courts, the Copyright Office,
and treatise authors. Finally, subpart D notes several policy reasons for
adopting the Registration Approach.
A. Plain Language of the Copyright Act
The Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n interpreting a statutory provision, [a
court begins] with the plain language of the statute.” 103 The court,
however, too quickly found ambiguity in § 411(a) and too quickly
moved to the surrounding sections of the Act. In doing so, it failed to
put the relevant clause in its proper context. The sections below
examine (1) the relevant sentence of § 411(a), (2) § 411(a) as a whole,
and (3) the related sections of the Copyright Act.
1. The (Most) Relevant Sentence of § 411(a)
The most relevant sentence of § 411(a) reads: “[N]o civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.” 104 By moving beyond
§ 411(a) after simply finding that § 101 of the Act gave “no guidance”
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 621–22.
Id. at 616 (citing K & N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bluat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007)).
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
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for the definition of “registration,” 105 the Ninth Circuit completely
ignored the last part of the sentence, which requires that registration be
“made in accordance with this title.” 106 After looking to § 101 for the
definition of “registration,” the appropriate next step should have been
to examine the Act to determine the requirements of such registration. 107
In other words, the Ninth Circuit stopped at an incomplete definition of
what registration is without proceeding to how registration is made, as
required by § 411. 108
Other courts have not been so quick to make this error. The Tenth
Circuit examined the Act’s plain language in La Resolana Architects to
determine when a registration has been “made in accordance with” the
Copyright Act. 109 Citing the relevant parts of the Act, the court found
that
Registration is satisfied by completing the following steps:
a. application and payment of a fee, § 408;
b. deposit of a copy of the copyrightable material, § 408;
c. examination by the Register of Copyrights, § 410;
d. registration (or refusal to register) by the Register, § 410;
e. issuance of certificate of registration, § 410. 110

The court went on to note that nowhere did this “series of affirmative
steps by both the applicant and the Copyright Office” indicate that
“mere receipt of copyrightable material” would be sufficient to establish
registration under § 411. 111 Had the Ninth Circuit similarly attempted to
flesh out the full meaning of § 411(a), it would have likely found that
receipt by the Copyright Office of an application, a deposit, and fees was
only part of a registration “made in accordance with” the Copyright
Act. 112

105. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (“‘Registration’ is unhelpfully defined as a ‘registration of a
claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.’ Because the clause at issue gives
no guidance in interpreting the meaning of ‘registration,’ we turn to the language of the statute as a
whole to determine the intended meaning.” (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010)).
106. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
107. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (citations omitted).
108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
109. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir.
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
110. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 410 (2006)).
111. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1200. The court further stated that a copyright holder is
entitled to sue for infringement only after “those steps are followed and registration is ‘made.’” Id. at
1201.
112. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
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2. Section 411(a) as a Whole
Additionally, upon finding that “registration” had an ambiguous
meaning as defined by § 101, the Ninth Circuit jumped immediately to
examining §§ 408–412, the sections of the Act that govern copyright
registration. 113 Instead, it should have placed the relevant sentence in its
immediate context by next examining § 411(a) as a whole. 114
Reading the (most) relevant sentence along with the subsequent
sentence is particularly illuminating:
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case,
however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil
action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is
served on the Register of Copyrights. 115

The second sentence indicates that delivery of the requisite materials
and the refusal of a copyright registration are two separate acts. If
refusal of registration is a discrete act, it then follows that its opposite,
approval of registration, is also a discrete act. Therefore, whether a
registration is refused or approved, the Register must perform an
affirmative action before the applicant may file suit. The Ninth Circuit
noted as much when it acknowledged that “this subsection could be read
to mean that Congress intended registration to require acceptance or
refusal by the Register, not mere delivery.” 116 Plainly read together, the
two sentences provide a simple roadmap for infringement litigation: (1)
if the Register examines and approves a copyright’s registration, the
litigant may then sue for copyright infringement with no additional
steps; and (2) if the Register examines and refuses the registration, the
litigant may still sue so long as he or she provides the Register with
notice.

113. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). Strangely, the court looks
to § 410(a) and then returns to § 411(a), which the court readily admits “contain(s) language that
suggests that registration requires some affirmative steps to be taken by the Copyright Office.” Id. at
617. It finds no language in § 411(a), the very subsection at issue, that suggests that mere receipt of an
application effects a registration, yet it finds the statute ambiguous. Id. at 617–18.
114. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating that determine
ambiguity by “the specific context in which that language is used”).
115. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (emphasis added).
116. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (citing, e.g., Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1,
3–4 (D.D.C. 2002)) (citation omitted).
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Congress used the same verb, “institut[e],” in both sentences. 117 This
redundant usage informs our understanding of Congress’s intent. In
general, words within the same statute should be given the same
meaning. 118 Under certain circumstances, however, the Application
Approach requires two different meanings for the verb “institut[e].”119
Under this approach, when a registration application is submitted, a
litigant may “initiate” an infringement suit; if the Register subsequently
refuses to register the copyright, the suit may assumedly “continue”
upon notice to the Register. 120 On the other hand, the meaning of the
word “institut[e]” is static under the Registration Approach: a suit may
be “initiated” upon registration approval, or it may be “initiated” upon
registration refusal. Because Congress used the same word twice, it
likely intended this internal consistency and did not seem to contemplate
the institution of a civil action when the validity of a copyright
registration was still in doubt. 121 The plainest reading of the statute, the
reading that gives a consistent meaning to the word “institut[e],” makes
the Register a gatekeeper who must affirmatively approve or refuse a
copyright registration before a litigant may initiate an infringement suit.
Furthermore, courts that have adopted the Application Approach give
little credit to Congress’s drafting prowess. Had Congress intended an
infringement action to be able to be instituted when the Copyright Office
received the appropriate application, fees, and deposit, it could have
clearly written the statute as such. Indeed, it did so when describing
what to do when a registration was refused. 122 Fewer definitional
acrobatics are needed when § 411(a) is read under the Registration
117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (noting that no civil action “shall be instituted” until registration; upon
refusal, the applicant “is entitled to institute a civil action” with notice to the Register (emphasis added)).
118. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (presume that “identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning” (internal citations omitted));
MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 311–12 (Roy Wilson ed., 11th ed. 1962) (It is
“reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part
of the Act.”).
119. Webster’s Dictionary defines “institute” as “to originate” or to “initiate.” WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1171 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1981).
120. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). This inconsistency is particularly problematic considering that (1)
this second usage (to “continue”) is found nowhere in Webster’s definition of “institute,” and (2) the
word “institute” is used in such close proximity to itself (in back-to-back sentences within the same
subsection). Were Application Approach courts to apply a consistent meaning to the word “institute,”
they would have to read the statute as allowing the initiation of a suit upon an application for registration
and then the apparent (and senseless) re-initiation of the suit upon refusal of registration. A suit cannot
begin after it has already begun.
121. Put another way, Congress provided no guidance regarding what an applicant must do if
registration has been refused after a civil suit has been instituted.
122. 17 U.S.C.A. 411(a) (discussing the situation “where the deposit, application, and fee required
for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been
refused”).
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Approach.
3. Other Provisions
The Ninth Circuit looked to provisions beyond § 411(a), namely
§ 408 and § 410, in an effort to resolve the perceived ambiguity. 123
Including the latter half of § 411(a) stated above, the court found four
other sections relevant to when a copyright is “registered.” It effectively
found that the Registration/Application Approach scorecard was 2–1–1:
that § 411(a) and § 410(a) lent support to the Registration Approach;
that § 408(a) lent support to the Application Approach; and that § 410(d)
could support either. 124 This analysis and finding of ambiguity,
however, may have been results-driven as the court just as easily could
have found that all four subsections favored the Registration Approach.
The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that § 410(a) contains “language
that suggests that registration requires some affirmative steps” by the
Copyright Office. 125 Section 410(a) reads:
[w]hen, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that, in
accordance with the provisions of this title, the material deposited
constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and
formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall register
the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under the
seal of the Copyright Office. 126

Section 410(a) clearly requires the Register’s examination and
approval before a registration is complete. 127 The requirement of such
an affirmative act cuts against the Application Approach, and it is
difficult to understand how language that is merely arguably ambiguous
elsewhere could trump the clarity of § 410(a). This view is further
supported by the text of § 411(a), which seems to contemplate an
approval-or-refusal regime of copyright registration, discussed above in
Part IV.A.2.
The Ninth Circuit found that § 408(a) “blurs the line between
application and registration and favors the application approach.”128

123. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactive, 606 F.3d 612, 616–618 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 617.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
127. Id. Although the verbs are not presented sequentially in the subsection, arranging them in
such a manner provides a clear roadmap for the registration process: (1) deposit, (2) examine, (3)
determine, (4) register, and (5) issue.
128. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
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The relevant text reads, “the owner of copyright or of any exclusive
right in the work may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the
application and fee specified.” 129 The court found that this section
implied that “the sole requirement for obtaining registration is delivery
of the appropriate documents and fee.” 130 This reading gives short shrift
to practical considerations: relevant materials must be submitted as an
initial step in the process before the Register can examine and register a
copyrightable work. The heading of § 408, “Copyright [R]egistration in
[G]eneral,” 131 also indicates that the first paragraph may simply be
giving a general overview of the process rather than describing the nutsand-bolts of the process found in subsequent sections. 132 Given the
heading, it is appropriate to read subsection (a) as being a general
outline that merely indicates the materials that the Register will need in
order to grant a registration.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that § 410(d) could be read to support
either the Registration Approach or the Application Approach. The
section reads, “[t]he effective date of a copyright registration is the day
on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by
the Register of Copyrights . . . to be acceptable for registration, have all
been received in the Copyright Office.” 133 The court noted that the
back-dating supported the view “that application is the critical event,” 134
but it also found that “the statute could be read to require action by the
Register to effect registration.” 135
The court, however, took no notice of the fact that § 410(d) uses the
phrase “effective date.” None of the sections discussing registration as a
precondition to bringing an infringement suit uses the phrase “effective
date,” but one other section notably does: § 412. 136 Section 412
describes “certain remedies” such as statutory damages and attorney’s
129. 17 U.S.C. 408(a) (2006).
130. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. Although the court found that the text implied adherence to
the Application Approach, it cited (but did not discuss) a contrary district court case from within its own
circuit. Id. (citing and overruling Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C-97-3873, 1998 WL 320817, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 15, 1998) (noting that § 408(a) means “merely that the delivery of the application is a step the
applicant must take, not that delivery is sufficient by itself to obtain a registration”) (citations omitted)).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 408.
132. The heading of a section may be used to resolve ambiguities in a statute. See SUTHERLAND,
2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:14 (Norman Singer ed., 7th ed. 2007) (“[W]here
the meaning of the act is ambiguous, . . . the headings may serve as an aid to legislative intent.”).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006).
134. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
135. Id.
136. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2010). The heading of § 412 reads “Registration as a prerequisite
to certain remedies.” Id.
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fees that are only available for infringement occurring after the effective
date of registration. 137 The Act quite clearly describes how to determine
the effective date 138 and how it affects infringement remedies. 139 The
plain language of the statute, however, gives no indication regarding the
effective date’s effect on the registration itself or on when an
infringement action may be instituted. Because the effective date of
registration is described in § 410(d), ignored in § 411(a), and referenced
in § 412, the most sensible interpretation is that the effective date is only
relevant to remedies and not to the institution of an infringement suit.
The back-dating that created ambiguity in the Ninth Circuit’s
determination of registration 140 turns out to be irrelevant to the
discussion of § 411.
After noting two sections that supported the Registration
Approach, 141 the Ninth Circuit observed that “[o]ther sections of the
Act, however, cast doubt on this interpretation.” 142 The court’s doubts
were unfounded, however. As described above, both §§ 408(a) and
410(d), are entirely consistent with the Registration Approach, which
can and should be adopted based on the plain language of the Copyright
Act. 143
B. Legislative History
In addition to disregarding the plain language of § 411(a), the Ninth
Circuit’s adoption of the Application Approach also ignored the statute’s
legislative history. The report of the House Judiciary Committee 144
clearly contemplated the retention of an active role by the Register of
Copyrights while giving copyright holders the right to sue should their
registration be refused.
Section 411’s precondition of registration was not unique to the
Copyright Act of 1976. 145 As one commentator wrote, “[T]he
137. Id. See also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 2010) (describing possible damages and
attorney’s fees, respectively).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (“The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an
application, deposit, and fee . . . have all been received in the Copyright Office.”).
139. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be made
for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the
effective date of its registration . . . .”).
140. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
141. Id. at 617 (finding that §§ 410(a) and 411(a) “contain language that suggests that registration
requires some affirmative steps”).
142. Id.
143. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408–12 (West 2010).
144. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
145. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010).
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requirement that the registration formality be complied with as a
prerequisite to the institution of an infringement action has been a
feature of federal U.S. copyright law since 1790.” 146 The first federal
copyright act in 1790 required the deposit of a copy of the work with the
clerk of the local district court. 147 Section 12 of the 1909 Act (later
renumbered to Section 13) retained the registration requirement as a
prerequisite to suit. 148
In 1956, the Second Circuit addressed the prerequisite of registration
under the 1909 Act. 149 In Vacheron, the federal district court judge
rejected a wrist watch designer’s copyright registration, finding that a
watch was not a “work of art” under the 1909 Act. 150 Because the 1909
Act “forbade any action for infringement of the copyright when the
Register of Copyrights had refused, as he did, to accept the watch as
copyrightable under § 5(g),” the Second Circuit held that the
infringement action had been properly dismissed. 151 Furthermore, the
court found that the prerequisite of “registration” required affirmative
action by the Register. 152
When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, the House
Judiciary Committee wrote that the purpose of the first sentence of
§ 411(a) was to “restat[e] the present statutory requirement that
registration must be made before a suit for copyright infringement is
instituted,” while the purpose of the second and third sentences were to
“alter the present law as interpreted in Vacheron.” 153 In other words, the
1976 Act did not disturb the registration requirement of the 1909 Act,
which had long been interpreted as requiring affirmative action by the
146. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:64 (2010). The author also notes that
§ 411(a) is “remarkably like” the 1710 Statute of Anne, England’s original copyright statute. Id.
§ 17:64.10 (citing 8 Anne c. 19 §§ 1:5-9 (1710)).
147. Id. § 17:64.30 (“‘[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act . . . unless he shall
first deposit, and in all other cases, unless he shall before publication deposit a printed copy of the title
of’” the work. (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 3)).
148. Id. § 17:64.40 (“No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in
any work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such
work shall have been complied with.” (citing Act of March 4, 1909, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.)).
149. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Courltre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d
Cir. 1958).
150. Id. at 638–39 (noting that copyrightable subject material includes “‘works of art; models or
designs for works of art’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) of the Copyright Act of 1909)).
151. Id. at 639 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 13 of the 1909 Act).
152. Id. at 640–41 (The Act “denies the right to sue for infringement ‘until the provisions of this
title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with,’
and that imports more than the mere ‘deposit of copies.’ Since the owner must submit an application
and pay the required fees in order to make a deposit, . . . we can think of no other added condition for
‘registration’ but acceptance by the Register.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 13, 202.3(b))).
153. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 7
K-EMERSON

1568

9/24/2011 4:27:27 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Register of Copyrights. The only alteration Congress intended to make
was to allow a litigant whose registration had been refused by the
Register to bring an infringement suit so long as notice is served on the
Register, who may then choose to join the suit on the issue of
registrability. 154
Furthermore, the legislative history of § 410 indicates that registration
requires an affirmative action by the Register of Copyrights. The House
Judiciary Committee noted that “[t]he first two subsections of section
410 set forth the two basic duties of the Register of Copyrights with
respect to copyright registration: (1) to register the claim and issue a
certificate if the [application is approved], and (2) to refuse registration
and notify the applicant if the” application is rejected. 155 This report
shows that Congress envisioned the Register taking an active role. Read
in conjunction with the text of § 411(a), which requires that registration
be “made in accordance with this title,” 156 it seems clear that registration
is “made” by actions of the Register, not merely by actions of the
applicant; indeed, it is one of the “two basic duties” of the Register. 157
The process envisioned by Congress seems clear: the Register will
receive the materials, examine them, and then either register or refuse
the claim. The Application Approach is incompatible with this simple
reading of the statute, of the history of the Act, and of Congress’s intent.
C. Misplaced Reliance on Persuasive Authority
In following the Application Approach, the Ninth Circuit misread or
ignored several sources of persuasive authority. The next sections will
examine (1) its overstatement of the circuit split, (2) its snub of the
Copyright Office, and (3) its selective and uncritical use of
commentators.
1. Misreading the Circuits
The Ninth Circuit rather cavalierly noted that its sister circuits were
evenly split, two to two, between the Application and the Registration
Approaches. It simply noted that “the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have
adopted the application approach,” 158 and that “[t]he Tenth and Eleventh
154. See id. (“Under section 411, a rejected claimant who has properly applied for registration
may maintain an infringement suit if notice of it is served on the Register of Copyrights.”).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010).
157. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476.
158. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Apple
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Circuits have adopted the registration approach.” 159 It made no analysis,
however, of the relative strength of the holdings. In particular, the
Seventh Circuit’s purported adoption of the Application Approach is
suspect.
The chosen approaches of several of the circuits are unambiguous.
The Fifth Circuit endorses the Application Approach. 160 The Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, clearly endorse the Registration
Approach. 161 Additionally, prior to Cosmetic Ideas, the Tenth Circuit
had been the only circuit court to provide a detailed analysis of the two
approaches. 162
The position of the Seventh Circuit, however, is not as clear. In
Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc., the alleged infringer
argued that the school board did not have a valid copyright registration
on the tests that the defendant published. 163 Writing for the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Posner said:
Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright
Office to be valid, an application for registration must be filed before the
copyright can be sued upon. In its application for registration the school
board claimed to have a copyright in the entire contents of the tests. Had
the claim been false, the registration should not have issued and maybe
therefore the copyright could not have been sued upon. 164

Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984); Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance,
Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131
S. Ct. 686 (2010).
159. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (citing La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel
Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,
130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir.
1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)).
160. See Apple Barrel Prods., 730 F.2d at 386–87. Parroting the general requirement of § 408
without offering any analysis of § 411(a), the Fifth Circuit noted that as a precondition to a copyright
infringement, one merely needs to prove “payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question,
and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application,” but not actual possession of a
registration certificate. Id. (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1]).
161. See M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488–89 (dismissing an action for “failure to satisfy the
condition precedent of having registered its copyright before initiating [an] infringement action” after an
application had been filed but before a registration certificate had been received); La Resolana
Architects, 416 F.3d at 1205 (noting that the Copyright Act requires “actual registration by the Register
of Copyrights” and not “mere submission of a copyright application” before an infringement action may
be instituted).
162. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201–05. As stated above, the court then adopted the
Registration Approach. Id. at 1205.
163. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631.
164. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Judge Posner then mused in parentheses, “(Or
maybe yes, because the copyright would have been registered, and because the statute requires only a
refused registration, which might be the equivalent of an improper registration, not an actual
registration, as the premise for the suit. We need not decide.)” Id.
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Judge Posner may be adopting the Application Approach, requiring
only that “an application . . . be filed.” 165 He also says, however, that
for a false or improper application, “the registration should not have
been issued,” 166 indicating that an affirmative action by the Copyright
Office is required. In the end, the Seventh Circuit did not expressly rule
on whether the Registration or the Application Approach should be
adopted. 167 Furthermore, Judge Posner’s analysis seemed to conflate
application, registration, and issuance, which muddied the waters even
further. 168 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s position is not as clear as the
Ninth Circuit makes it out to be, and it certainly does not stand on the
same strong foundation of reasoning as does the Tenth Circuit’s
adoption of the Registration Approach in La Resolana Architects. 169
Had the Ninth Circuit conducted a more thorough analysis of the circuit
split, it might have been persuaded to endorse the Registration Approach
in Cosmetic Ideas. 170
2. Ignoring the Copyright Office’s Own Interpretation
In deciding Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit completely ignored the
Copyright Office’s own interpretation of when registration is
complete. 171 Although a legislative office’s interpretation of a statute is
not binding on a court, the Copyright Office’s reading of § 411(a)
should hold at least some persuasive value.
The Copyright Office is a service unit of the Library of Congress,
which in turn is an agency of the legislative branch of the
government. 172 At least one of the Copyright Office’s own publications
plainly adopts the Registration Approach. Copyright Circular 10 reads,
“the Copyright Office must have acted on your application before you
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Although Judge Posner dismissed the alleged infringer’s argument as “frivolous,” his
reasoning on this point did not rest on when a copyright registration is effective. Instead, he found that
any test questions that the plaintiff did not directly author would likely be considered “works made for
hire” so that “the school board would have owned the copyright anyway.” Id.
168. See id. (“Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright Office to be
valid, an application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued upon. . . . Had the
claim been false, the registration should not have issued . . . .”).
169. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realty Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005),
abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
170. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
171. Id.
172. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY (2010),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.
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can file a suit for copyright infringement.” 173 As the sentence discusses
the precondition required to file an infringement lawsuit, it seems to be
directly addressing § 411(a). The phrase “must have acted on” indicates
that mere receipt of an application by the Copyright Office is not
sufficient to effect a “registration” under the preconditions of § 411(a).
Instead, an affirmative act by the Office is required, such as examination
followed by approval or rejection. 174
The Copyright Office is directly under Congress’s control. If
Congress were unhappy with the Copyright Office’s adoption of the
Registration Approach, Congress could have instructed the Copyright
Office to change its approach, amended the statute to add clarity, or
done both. By taking no action, Congress has tacitly approved of the
Registration Approach, indicating that the approach is in line with its
intent in passing § 411(a).
3. Copyright Commentators
Throughout its decision to adopt the Application Approach, the Ninth
Circuit leans on the persuasive authority of “the leading treatise on
copyright,” Nimmer on Copyright. 175 Other commentators, however,
flatly reject Nimmer’s reasoning and advocate the Registration
Approach. 176
William F. Patry, author of Patry on Copyright, writes that the courts
that have adopted the Application Approach “were led astray by
Nimmer.” 177 Patry continues, “Nimmer’s view is not an interpretation
of the statute: it is a flagrant disregard of the statute, its legislative
history, its statutory history, in short, every evidence of Congress’s
intent.” 178 He goes on to criticize Nimmer’s disregard of the plain
173. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10, SPECIAL HANDLING (2010), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf.
174. It may also be noted that Circular 10 was revised in the same month (May, 2010) as the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas (May 25, 2010), indicating that this is the Office’s most
current thinking, even in light of the circuit split that existed prior to Cosmetic Ideas.
175. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
34). The court found Nimmer’s reasoning persuasive on several points: (1) Because a plaintiff will
ultimately be allowed to proceed with a suit regardless of the Copyright Office’s approval or rejection,
“it makes little sense to create a period of ‘legal limbo’ in which suit is barred.” Id. at 620 (quotation
and citation omitted). (2) Delay by the Copyright Office may lead to the expiration of the statute of
limitations, “occasion[ing] complete inability to recover damages.” Id. (3) “[T]he pace of litigation
entails that the Copyright Office will typically have granted or refused registration during [an
infringement suit’s] pendency,” enabling the Register to join a suit should it choose to do so following
the rejection of an application. Id. at 621 (quotation and citation omitted).
176. See PATRY, supra note 146, § 17:78.
177. Id.
178. Id. In the same section, Patry also points out, “Tellingly, the Solicitor General of the United
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language and structure of § 411(a), Nimmer’s misplaced reliance on and
misreading of § 410, 179 and Nimmer’s purported inversion of the
registration process. 180
Patry clearly feels that the Registration
Approach is both the better approach and the one required both by the
plain text of the statute and by Congress’s intent.
While Nimmer is admittedly the leading commentator on copyright
law, wise men may be wrong. 181 Patry makes a compelling argument
both for his case and against Nimmer’s regarding the correct
interpretation of § 411. Because the Ninth Circuit cited Nimmer without
examining his argument, 182 the court may be lumped in with others who
“were led astray by Nimmer.” 183
D. The Registration Approach Best Meets Policy Concerns
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Application Approach in part because
the court believed that the Application Approach better fulfilled
desirable policy goals such as broad copyright protection, a robust
federal register, fairness, and conservation of judicial resources. 184 The
court, however, failed to recognize that the Registration Approach
fulfilled these policy goals as well as or better than the Application
Approach. The following four sections address the Registration
States rejected Nimmer’s theory in her amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Reed Elsevier case.”
Id. (referencing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)).
179. Id. § 17:78 (“Nimmer’s reading of section 410 was undertaken . . . not to illuminate the
meaning and purpose of section 411(a), but to subvert it.”).
180. Id. (“[W]hile the Copyright Office does not grant copyrights, only the Copyright Office
‘makes’ registration of a claim to copyright within the meaning of section 411(a). Nimmer inverts the
statute by having the applicant effectively ‘make’ the registration.”).
181. For example, before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, Nimmer
wrote, “registration is a condition precedent for a court to exercise jurisdiction in an infringement case,”
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a] (Rel. 78-5/2009), while noting in a footnote that “a
minority view treats these matters [of registrations] are [sic] prerequisites for claim-processing, not as
strictly jurisdictional.” Id. § 7.16[B][1][a], n.38.3a. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the “minority
view.” Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1247 (2010) (“Section 411(a) thus imposes a type of
precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment.”). Nimmer’s treatise has since been
revised. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a] (Rel. 82-8/2010) (“Registration is a
condition precedent for an infringement case to move forward in federal court.”).
182. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
183. PATRY, supra note 146, § 17:78; see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright
Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581, 583 (2004) (noting that while Nimmer on Copyright and treatises in
general “can be quite valuable, their impact on the law can actually be negative if they are too heavily
and unquestioningly relied on”).
184. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 (“This interpretation ensures the broad copyright protection
that the 1976 Act provided[,] . . . accomplishes the central purpose of registration—the compilation of a
robust national register of existing copyrights—and at the same time avoids unfairness and waste of
judicial resources.”).
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Approach in relation to the policy goals of (1) a robust federal register,
(2) fairness, (3) judicial economy, and (4) the relaxation of formalities.
1. Robust Register
Congress incentivized copyright registration with the goal of
maintaining a robust federal register, finding such a register “useful and
important to users and the public at large.” 185 The Ninth Circuit found
that this goal “is accomplished equally by the registration and
application approaches.” 186 In reality, however, this is likely not
correct, as the Registration Approach may encourage more copyright
holders to register their works, leading to a more robust register than one
under an Application Approach regime. As the Cosmetic Ideas court
noted, “copyright holders frequently register specifically for the purpose
of being able to bring suit.” 187 Presumably, copyright holders whose
works are being infringed would like to bring suit as soon as possible in
order to stop the infringement. By requiring the issuance of a certificate
as a precondition of an infringement suit, the Registration Approach, in
effect, incentivizes early registration by disincentivizing registration at
the time of infringement.
The Application Approach gives little incentive for early registration
in general and no incentive at all for the registration of non-infringed
works. Considering the minimal time, effort, and money required to
apply for a copyright registration, copyright holders suffer little if they
wait until infringement occurs before applying for a registration under
the Application Approach; they will be able to bring suit as soon as the
Register receives the materials. 188 Consequently, if the Application
Approach gains widespread acceptance among the federal circuits, it is
conceivable that the future bulk of the federal register will consist only
of infringed works. In sum, the Application Approach gives little reason
to register non-infringed works and imposes little penalty for delaying
registration until they are in fact infringed, doing little to achieve
Congress’s goal of a robust register.
On the other hand, under the Registration Approach the copyright
holder will suffer an inevitable delay between the time of registration
application and approval while the Register receives and examines the

185. Id. at 619 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)).
186. Id. at 620.
187. Id. at 619.
188. This process will usually be complete within just a few days—while the application, deposit,
and fees are in the mail (or fewer, using the online submission process).
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copyright application. 189 Should infringing activity occur during this
time, the infringer can continue to profit from the wrongful activity
while the copyright holder awaits approval of his or her registration.
While this by itself seems unjust, a copyright holder can avoid this
frustration by applying for registration soon after the copyrightable work
is created and before infringement occurs. 190 Doing so will increase his
likelihood of holding a registration certificate at the time of
infringement, enabling the copyright holder to sue immediately. Of
course, it is inevitable that infringement of only some of these works
will occur, resulting in the registration of both infringed and noninfringed works as well as a more robust federal register.
2. Fairness
The Ninth Circuit felt as though the Application Approach “avoid[ed]
unfairness” 191 by allowing a litigant to bring suit almost immediately
rather than being forced to endure a prolonged period of infringement. 192
The court also feared that the Registration Approach could lead to the
expiration of the statute of limitations while the copyright holder awaits
a decision by the Register of Copyrights. 193 It found that “[o]nly the
application approach fully protects litigants from any disadvantage
caused by this timelag.” 194 The court’s fears, however, were unfounded
and overstated, and they can be fully addressed and resolved by the
Registration Approach.
First of all, given that the plain language and legislative history of
§ 411(a) contemplate affirmative action by the Register before an
infringement suit may be instituted, 195 it is unclear how requiring a

189. As discussed below, the copyright holder will not ultimately be harmed by this time lag, as
the effective date of registration (and therefore the date from which statutory damages may be
recovered) is the date that the application was received by the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C.A.
§§ 410(d), 412 (West 2010).
190. As an additional incentive to register a work early in its lifecycle, a registration certificate
constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright’s validity only if registration was made before or
within five years of the first publication of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006). If registration occurs
outside this window (for example, in response to infringement occurring six years after publication),
then the certificate will be awarded evidentiary weight according to the discretion of the court. Id.
191. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621.
192. Id. at 620 (“The application approach avoids this legal limbo—and avoids prolonging the
period of infringement—by allowing a litigant to proceed with an infringement suit as soon as he has
taken all of the necessary steps to register the copyright at issue.”).
193. Id. at 620–21.
194. Id.
195. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010); see also supra Part IV.A.3 regarding “effective date”
and remedies.
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litigant to fulfill a precondition to filing a lawsuit is in any way “unfair.”
Copyright protection and enforcement are the results of legislative
grace. 196 Registration is a statutory requirement of an infringement
action, no different than the filing of a complaint or the service of
process.
The court is also unclear on why forcing a litigant to endure a period
of alleged infringement is necessarily unfair.
The Registration
Approach penalizes a copyright holder’s inaction in terms of time and
mental frustration, but not in terms of the ultimate damages that the
copyright holder will be entitled to receive. Section 410(d)’s backdating
provision makes the effective date of registration the date on which the
Copyright Office receives the application, deposit, and fee, 197 and
statutory damages and attorney’s fees can be awarded for any
infringement occurring after this effective date. 198 Therefore, the
copyright holder will be able to recover for any damages incurred while
the Register processes the application.
Finally, when proposing the “worst-case scenario” in which a
copyright holder loses the ability to sue due to the running of the statute
of limitations, 199 the court neglected to acknowledge the Copyright
Office’s “Special Handling” option. While a registration certificate may
normally take up to several months to issue, an applicant may elect to
pay an extra fee for “Special Handling,” which is “the expedited
processing of an online or paper application for registration of a claim to
copyright.” 200 It is available in limited circumstances or for compelling
reasons, one of which is “pending or prospective litigation.” 201 This
196. In general, the United States does not recognize “moral rights” of authors and treats
copyrights purely as personal property that may be freely transferred. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1985) (“The 1976 Act does not purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright owner.
Nevertheless, a creator, regardless of whether he holds the copyright in his work, has a personal interest
in preserving the artistic integrity of his work and compelling recognition for his authorship. In many
European and Third World nations personal rights are protected by a legal doctrine commonly known as
the moral right.”). Visual artists, however, are offered some protection regarding their reputation and
distortions of their work, even if the artist does not own the work’s copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)
(2006); Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral
Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990).
197. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006).
198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2010). Additionally, a copyright holder remains entitled to recover
actual damages for any infringement that occurred before the effective date of registration. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 504 (West 2010).
199. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
200. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10, SPECIAL HANDLING 1 (2010), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf.
201. Id. Other circumstances include “customs matters, or contract or publishing deadlines that
necessitate the expedited issuance of a certificate.” Id.
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request can be quickly made online, and “[o]nce a request for special
handling is received and approved, every attempt is made to process the
claim . . . within five working days.” 202
Therefore, a copyright holder who is nearing the end of the statute of
limitations may expedite registration through the “Special Handling”
procedure. As the Copyright Office aims roughly for a one-week
turnaround time, 203 the applicant should suffer little delay in being able
to file an infringement suit. Additionally, the large “Special Handling”
fee 204 further incentivizes early application so that the fee can be
avoided, which should in turn bolster the number of works registered
with the Copyright Office. While it is true that the Application
Approach might allow the copyright holder to file an infringement
action perhaps a week or two earlier, this small benefit to the copyright
holder is offset and overshadowed by the furtherance of Congress’s goal
of maintaining a robust federal register. 205
3. Judicial Efficiency
The Ninth Circuit found that the Application Approach “‘best
effectuate[s] the interest of justice and promote[s] judicial economy.’”206
However, in its desire to “avoi[d] . . . waste of judicial resources,” 207 the
court did not properly consider the ways in which the Registration
Approach also promotes as much or more judicial economy.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Application Approach avoids
unnecessary delays that put the copyright holder in a “period of ‘legal
limbo’ in which suit is barred,” 208 but a copyright holder need not
endure a prolonged period of infringement before bringing suit. As
202. Id.
203. Id. (“within five working days”).
204. Copyright Fees, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited June 13, 2011) (fee
currently $760 per expedited claim).
205. Courts should also discourage copyright holders who have notice of infringement from
sleeping on their rights. A copyright holder who waits until the end of the three year period to register
would be similarly disadvantaged as one who waits two years and 364 days to talk to his or her lawyer,
as it will take time for the lawyer to draft and file a complaint. The statute of limitations exists to
encourage prompt action by a litigant and fairness to the opposition.
206. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Int’l
Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000),
cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010)).
207. Id. (“‘Nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such
as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.’” (quoting Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892))).
208. Id. at 619–20 (“‘[G]iven that the claimant . . . will ultimately be allowed to proceed
regardless of how the Copyright Office treats the application, it makes little sense to create a period of
‘legal limbo’ in which suit is barred.’” (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a][i])).
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described in the previous section, 209 pre-infringement registration or the
“Special Handling” option will minimize any period of “legal limbo.” 210
Given these options, a copyright holder should be able to sue
immediately or, upon receiving notice of infringement and exercising
the “Special Handling” registration option, after only a short time.
The Ninth Circuit also thought that the requirement of waiting for
approval or rejection of a copyright registration was a “needless
formality” 211 that led to an “‘inefficient and peculiar result.’”212 A court
that adopts the Registration Approach, however, will ultimately save
judicial resources as it will have to entertain fewer motions,
amendments, and arguments. 213 A clear adoption of the Registration
Approach will result in litigants whose copyright registrations have been
either affirmatively approved or rejected by the Copyright Office,
resulting in a clear litigation strategy. The Application Approach, on the
other hand, may lead to several inefficiencies during the course of
litigation.
For example, assume that a jurisdiction follows the Application
Approach and allows suit to be filed before a registration certificate has
actually been issued. Even if the registration is eventually approved, the
plaintiff will not have a registration certificate to use as prima facie
evidence of a valid copyright, 214 resulting in more arguments, more
209. See supra Part IV.D.2.
210. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34,
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]).
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491, 2002 WL 1906620, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002)). The Cosmetic Ideas court found that it “makes little sense to dismiss a
case (which will likely be refiled in a matter of weeks or months) simply because the Copyright Office
has not made a prompt decision that will have no substantive impact on whether or not a litigant can
ultimately proceed.” Id. at 620.
213. Inefficiencies arise when the approach to copyright registration in a given court or
jurisdiction is not known, especially in jurisdictions that adopt the Registration Approach. For example,
in M.G.B Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), a copyright holder
brought suit after applying for a copyright registration but before receiving it. Id. The trial court,
applying the Registration Approach, dismissed the case for failure to satisfy the registration
precondition. Id. at 1489. M.G.B. then filed an amended copyright registration application with the
Copyright Office, and upon being issued a certificate of registration, M.G.B filed a motion to amend its
original complaint, which the court granted over jurisdictional objections of the defendant. Id. The
circuit court noted that the more appropriate course of action would have been for the plaintiff to file a
new complaint once it received the certificate, it found that allowing the case to proceed was within the
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and supported by case law. Id. at 1488–89. Had the
jurisdiction clearly adopted the Registration Approach, M.G.B. would have waited to file suit until the
registration certificate had been received, avoiding the unnecessary motions, amendments, and
confusion.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006) (“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made
before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded
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motions, and more time of the court’s consumed. 215 Furthermore, if the
Copyright Office issues the certificate after litigation is begun, the
plaintiff will likely amend the complaint to reflect this fact, which,
depending on the stage of the proceeding, may change the evidentiary
burdens of the parties. 216
On the other hand, suppose that in the same Application Approach
jurisdiction the Copyright Office rejects an application for copyright
registration after litigation has already begun. The plaintiff must then
notify the Register of the intention to proceed with the infringement
action, and the Register will then have the option of joining regarding
the issue of registrability of the copyright claim. 217 Therefore, the action
has now added parties (potentially the Register), added issues (copyright
validity in addition to the copyright infringement), and added time (the
Register may appear within sixty days of service). 218 Alternatively,
upon learning that the registration was refused, the plaintiff may find the
infringement battle to be too onerous and decide to drop suit altogether,
resulting in a needlessly-filed-and-dropped lawsuit. Either way, judicial
resources are unnecessarily consumed.
In effect, because various burdens and litigation strategies ultimately
hang on the Register’s decision to approve or deny the registration, the
Application Approach itself creates a period of “legal limbo” 219 that
affects not just the plaintiff but all parties, the Register, and the court.
This “waste of judicial resources” 220 can easily be avoided by the clear
adoption of the Registration Approach. When a plaintiff is forced under
the Registration Approach to wait until a copyright is either approved or
rejected by the Copyright Office, the course of litigation is more obvious
and more efficient.

the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.”).
215. The Ninth Circuit noted that the absence of prima facie evidence may actually be a boon to
the defendant, as the plaintiff will bear a higher evidentiary burden of proving the validity of its
copyright. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 n.14. It did not note the extra time and resources consumed
by this higher burden, however.
216. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he Application approach allows for shifting entitlements” that “would generate uncertainty in
copyright litigation that the Act was designed to moderate.”), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
217. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010).
218. Id.
219. This period of “legal limbo” continues between the institution of a suit following the
submission of an application to the Copyright Office and the affirmative action of the Register.
220. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621.
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4. Formalities and Accordance with the Berne Convention
Section 411(a) imposes the formality of registration on copyright
holders of U.S. works who wish to bring an infringement suit, regardless
of whether a court adopts the Registration Approach or the Application
Approach.
According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he registration
approach’s added requirement of affirmative approval or rejection
before suit thus amounts to little more than just the type of needless
formality Congress generally worked to eliminate in the 1976 Act.” 221
Congress, however, did not “eliminate” formalities with the 1976 Act; it
merely reduced them. 222 Since the passage of the 1976 Act, it has
reduced them even further to make the United States a party to the Berne
Convention, and in doing so it has expressly considered and retained the
registration requirements of § 411(a).
In 1988, Congress amended § 411(a) of the Copyright Act and created
a two-tier system in which registration is a precondition to infringement
suits for United States works but not for foreign works. 223 In seeking to
reduce the formalities associated with registration and infringement
actions, Congress expressly considered dispatching with the registration
requirement altogether out of concern that “‘section 411(a) . . . is
incompatible with Article 5(2) [of the] Berne [Convention].’” 224 The
House of Representatives rejected the Senate’s proposed modification
that the registration precondition be eliminated completely, 225 and the
ultimate amendment of § 411(a) retained the registration formality for
U.S. works but not for foreign works. 226 In 1993, Congress again
considered a proposal that eliminated the registration requirement; the
proposal did not pass. 227
As Congress has considered and rejected several proposals that would
eliminate the formality of copyright registration altogether, Congress
clearly intends for some level of formality to remain intact. Both the
221. Id. at 620.
222. For example, registration is a precondition to an infringement suit, and a deposit must be
made with the Library of Congress in order to effect such registration.
223. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (noting that copyright registration is a precondition for a “civil action
for infringement of the copyright in any United States work”) (emphasis added).
224. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir.
2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3706, 3719), abrogated in part
by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
225. Id. at 1205 (“‘The House passed bill left current law intact, finding that current recordation
and registration are not formalities prohibited by Berne.’” (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 10091, 10095
(1988))).
226. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).
227. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1206 (citing Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897,
103d Congress (1993) (rewriting §§ 410 and 411 to eliminate the registration precondition).
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Application and Registration Approaches require the formalities of an
application, a deposit, and a fee before the institution of an infringement
action. While the Registration Approach adds the additional formality
of the Register’s approval, nothing indicates that Congress finds the first
three formalities acceptable but rejects the fourth. Congress has had
multiple opportunities to amend the statute with the express intention of
reducing formalities, but has instead chosen to leave the substantive
language of § 411(a) intact.
The Registration Approach is consistent with the intention of the 1976
Act, its subsequent amendments, and the Berne Convention. The twotiered system for U.S. and foreign works may be a bit unwieldy and
arguably undesirable, but it is what Congress has created. If Congress
found affirmative action by the Copyright Register prior to the
institution of an infringement suit to be a “needless formality,”228
Congress could have eliminated it by amending the statute; however, it
has not. Instead, Congress has decided that in order for a U.S. copyright
holder to gain the incentivized benefits of copyright registrations, the
holder must also suffer some formalities, one of which is—or at least
should be—the Register’s approval or rejection of a registration
application.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC/Interactivecorp, the Ninth Circuit erred in
adopting the Application Approach to copyright registration within the
meaning of § 411(a) of the Copyright Act. 229 In doing so, the court
disregarded Congress’s language and intent and substituted its own
judgment for what American copyright law should be.
The Registration Approach, which requires affirmative action by the
Register of Copyrights before an infringement action may be instituted,
is better supported by the plain language of the statute and its legislative
history. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on persuasive
authority was suspect. Finally, the Registration Approach supports
policy goals such as a robust federal register, fairness, judicial
efficiency, and accordance with international treaties as well as or better
than the Application Approach.
Nimmer wrote, “In some sense, the dispute between the registration
and application approaches is a tempest in a teapot.” 230 In practice, a
228. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
229. Id.
230. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][3][b][v].
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jurisdiction’s approach may have little effect on the overall impact on
the outcome of an infringement suit. A suit filed prematurely (that is,
before a registration certificate has been issued) in a jurisdiction that
follows the Registration Approach will likely be merely dismissed; the
copyright holder can probably refile in a matter of weeks or months.
The Copyright Office’s Special Handling procedure can expedite
registrations that are filed near the end of the statute of limitations. Due
process, however, mandates that citizens have notice of the laws that
govern them. While no one has apparently argued that § 411(a) is
unconstitutionally vague, the statute has eluded a consistent
interpretation.
Clarity can come in one of two ways. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
could grant certiorari to an appeal regarding the proper interpretation of
§ 411(a). The Court, however, seems to have little interest in doing so;
it recently denied certiorari to IAC/Interactivecorp’s petition despite the
widening circuit split. 231
Second, Congress could amend the Copyright Act to give clarity to
the meaning of “registration.” For example, it might change the text of
§ 101 to indicate that “registration” requires the Register’s affirmative
approval. 232 Congress could also amend the text of § 411(a) to show
(even more clearly than it already does) that registration as a
precondition to an infringement suit requires more than the Copyright
Office’s mere receipt of the applicable materials. 233
Whatever the source of the change, the Registration Approach is
better supported by the history and current language of § 411(a). It also
better serves the overall policy goals of the Copyright Act of 1976,
which was adopted to bring consistency to copyright actions, rights, and
remedies nationwide. With the text, history, and policy goals in mind,
the Supreme Court or Congress should adopt the Registration Approach
and give guidance to copyright holders and courts contemplating
copyright infringement actions.

231. IAC/Interactivecorp v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).
232. It might read that registration “means a registration of the claim affirmatively granted by the
Register of Copyrights in the original or the renewed and extended term of the copyright” (emphasized
text added to original text of 17 U.S.C. § 101).
233. Part of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) could be amended to read “no civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until an application for preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title and has been approved by
the Register of Copyrights” (emphasized text added to original text of § 411(a)). Alternatively, to
parallel the structure of the next sentence of § 411(a), it might read, “where the deposit, application and
fee required for preregistration or registration of a United States work have been delivered to the
Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been approved, the applicant is entitled to institute
a civil action for infringement.”
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